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RIGHT PERSON IN THE RIGHT PLACE: HOW THE
HOST COUNTRY IPR INFLUENCES THE
DISTRIBUTION OF INVENTORS IN OFFSHORE R&D
PROJECTS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
ANAND NANDKUMAR1,* and KANNAN SRIKANTH2
1 Strategy Department, Indian School of Business, Hyderabad, India
2 Department of Strategy & Organization, Lee Kong Chian School of Business,
Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore
Research summary: Prior work has shown that the strength of the intellectual property regime
(IPR) in a host country influences offshore R&D to that country. Building on this work we
propose that the strength of the IPR in a host country differentially influences the threat of
knowledge leakage on projects that are produced for the location where the multinational firm
is headquartered (home) versus the offshore location to which the R&D project is sent (host). We
argue and show that when the host location has a weak IPR, fewer host inventors are involved in
host R&D projects when compared to home R&D projects. We test our hypotheses using a dataset
of patents held by US assignees, but coinvented in 43 host locations with differing IPR strength.
Managerial summary: Multinational enterprises often cite the weak IPRs at emerging economy
host destinations as a significant impediment to offshore R&D activities in those countries, despite
the abundant supply of inexpensive scientific talent there. We find that the weak IPR at the host
destination is a greater impediment to offshore R&D that is aimed for end use at the host market
than for R&D that is aimed for end use globally or in the home market. Since IPRs are local, a
weaker IPR at the host location does not protect IP that is relevant to the host market. Since the
IPR at the home country is more relevant for technologies aimed at the home market, the IPR at
the host country is irrelevant for such R&D projects. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The internationalization of R&D activity of multi-
national enterprises (MNEs) is an important and
growing phenomenon. The increasing offshore
R&D activities by MNEs to emerging economies
such as India and China, which have a weak intel-
lectual property regime (IPR), however, poses the
question of how such offshore R&D is protected
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multinational R&D strategy; global organization of work;
knowledge spillover
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from imitation. We argue that R&D projects that are
relevant to the offshore location (host market) have
a relatively higher threat of intellectual property
(IP) leakage than R&D projects relevant to the
location where the MNE is headquartered (home
market). Therefore, somewhat surprisingly, the
MNE is likely to involve more host inventors from
weak IPR locations in R&D projects relevant to the
home market than in projects relevant to the host
market. Our findings contribute to the literature
on understanding how IPRs at the host location
influence MNE R&D (Branstetter, Fisman, and
Foley, 2006; Yang and Maskus, 2001; Zhao, 2006)
by showing how differences in leakage risks inher-
ent in host versus home R&D projects moderate
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the relation between the strength of the IPR at the
host location and the extent of involvement of host
inventors in MNE R&D projects.
A large body of work suggests that MNEs
locate R&D units internationally to take advan-
tage of the available knowledge (Chung and Yeaple,
2008; Feinberg and Gupta, 2004; Kogut and Chang,
1991). A few studies explicitly argue that spillover
benefits that emanate from R&D conducted by
other firms at the host location is an important
consideration for MNEs deciding where to locate
their foreign R&D centers (Almeida, 1996; Chung
and Yeaple, 2008; Feinberg and Gupta, 2004). The
strength of the IPR at the host location presum-
ably influences the extent to which a firm can utilize
knowledge spillovers, as well as whether a firm can
appropriate value from its IP. Therefore the strength
of the IPR at a location is likely to be an impor-
tant consideration in a MNE’s decision regarding
whether and to what extent to perform a specific
R&D project at any given host location. This is
because the MNE is likely to balance R&D produc-
tion considerations, such as factor prices and access
to knowledge at the host location, against the cost of
likely IP leakage in deciding the extent of host ver-
sus home inventor participation in R&D projects at
a given location. However, there is surprisingly little
work on how the strength of the IPR at the host loca-
tion influences the extent to which host inventors are
involved in MNEs’ R&D projects.
The closest work to ours is that of Zhao (2006),
who investigates how MNEs protect the IP that is
created in their captive centers located in countries
with weak IPRs. Zhao (2006) argues that MNEs
disaggregate projects into components, with some
components performed at offshore R&D centers in
locations with weak IPRs and others performed at
home. The IP generated in the weak IPR location
is protected because it is of little value unless
combined with the IP that is generated at home,
which is protected by the strong IPR at home.
Zhao (2006)calls this mechanism “strong internal
linkages” between the subsidiary and the head-
quarters. She empirically shows that US patents
developed in weak IPR locations have higher
forward self-citations than those developed in
strong IPR locations, which she argues is evidence
of strong internal linkages. We build on this work
by considering whether different types of R&D
projects conducted by the MNE at the host location
have different IP leakage threats.
MNEs perform R&D in international locations
to customize their products and services for the
host market, which we call host projects, and/or
to utilize the talent and knowledge available at the
host location to create products and services for
the home market, which we call home projects
(Kuemmerle, 1999). We argue that the strength of
the host location’s IPR is likely to matter crucially
for host projects since they are commercialized in
that location. However, home projects are likely
protected by the strong IPR at home and therefore
the extent to which the host location IPR matters
for value appropriation is unclear.We extend Zhao’s
work by considering how the strength of the IPR at
the host location and the nature of the R&D project
jointly influence the level of involvement of host
inventors in an offshore R&D project.
The differential influence of IPRs on home ver-
sus host projects has not been explicitly tested in the
international economics literature either. Branstet-
ter et al. (2006) show that host subsidiaries pay
higher royalties to headquarters after the host IPR
has been strengthened and argue thatMNEs transfer
more technology to host countries with a stronger
IPR. They also show that MNEs file more patents
in the host country after its IPR is strengthened.
While this work implies that stronger IPRs stimu-
late technology transfer and production of R&D that
is more applicable to the host country, they do not
explicitly differentiate between the leakage threats
on home versus host projects. Moreover, it is also
unclear whether the additional host country patents
were generated by headquarters, the subsidiary, or
in collaboration. In sum, prior work does not exam-
ine how changes in the IPR in the host location
influence the participation of host inventors on inno-
vations relevant to the home versus host locations
differentially. Our effort is directed precisely at this
question.
We test our hypotheses using a novel dataset
consisting of a matched sample of patents that
belong toMNEs headquartered in the United States.
Our dataset includes patents invented in the United
States and patents that are coinvented or fully
invented in 43 host countries with a strong or a weak
IPR. We also distinguish between home and host
projects based on the location in which the patent
was filed and compare the involvement of host
inventors in these patents. This empirical strategy is
similar to recent work that compares the influence
of IPRs across countries (Branstetter et al., 2006;
Lerner, 2009; Zhao, 2006) and several other studies
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on comparative institutional economics. We also
perform several robustness tests that increase our
confidence that the results may not be merely driven
by just the differences between host locations,
technologies or time trends.
Our key contribution is to highlight the joint
role of the strength of the IPR in the host country
and the location of its intended use (home vs. host
project) in the involvement of host inventors in
an R&D project. Although MNE R&D strategy
starkly illustrates this phenomenon, our theory is
also applicable to a multi-unit R&D setting in
which different R&D locations vary in the extent of
spillover risks, such as, for example, the influence
of differences in trade secrecy laws in different US
states (Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 2015; Png, 2011)
or the presence of direct competitors at a location
(Alcácer and Zhao, 2012).
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND
HYPOTHESES
When choosing offshore R&D, ideally, MNE man-
agers make decisions on staffing R&D projects at
different locations based on production consider-
ations such as differences in scientists’ wages or
the knowledge available at the different locations.
Weak IPRs at the host location will likely impede
such efficient resource allocation since MNE man-
agers must now also take into account the cost of IP
leakage, which will therefore influence the extent
to which an R&D project is committed to a specific
offshore location.
Consider a scenario in which an R&D manager
at an MNE has to allocate two types of labor input
to an R&D project: that from an inventor located at
MNE headquarters (home inventor) and that from
an inventor located at the host facility (host inven-
tor). Both these inputs are owned by the same
focal MNE and are imperfectly substitutable. We
assume that the cost of generating an innovation
consists primarily of the labor costs of the home
and host country inventors. We also assume that
in the absence of knowledge leakage, employing
host country inventors is cheaper than employing
home country inventors, either because host inven-
tors have lower wage rates or possess specialized
expertise that reduces the number of man–hours
spent on the project. We also assume that the home
location has a strong IPR, whereas the host coun-
try may have a strong or a weak IPR. Therefore,
offshore R&D may pose an equivalent or greater
threat of IP leakage compared to that at the home
location.
In our framework, the threat of IP leakage arises
from employing host inventors in an R&D project
who can be hired away by competitors. Prior work
has shown that employee mobility is a significant
source of knowledge transfer between firms and
that such spillovers tend to be geographically
localized (Agrawal, Cockburn, and McHale, 2006;
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). Such employee
“poaching” impacts the focal MNE in two ways.
First, competitors can utilize employees’ tacit
knowledge, such as knowhow, to infringe existing
patents or even invent workarounds. Second,
competitors may access and utilize proprietary
knowledge related to a MNE’s current (unpatented)
projects and leapfrog it.
We assume that a weak IPR at a host location
implies that both its patent and trade secrecy laws
are weak, so that an IP holder has very few legal
remedies when its IP is expropriated. A weak IPR
facilitates the leakage of an MNE’s proprietary IP
to a competitor more easily for at least two reasons:
first, a weak patent regime presents few remedies
for the innovator whose patent has been infringed,
which consequently incentivizes the infringement
of patents. Second, weak trade secrecy protection
provides limited remedies for theMNE that seeks to
prevent its employees from using its proprietary IP
for private gain. For instance, when trade secrecy
laws are weak, nondisclosure and noncompete
agreements are virtually unenforceable, allowing
imitators to rely on employee mobility to access
proprietary knowledge. Weak trade secrecy laws,
especially the restricted use of noncompete agree-
ments, incentivizes employee mobility (Gilson,
1999), which in turn increases the possibility of
knowledge leakage.
Finally, we assume that the greater the number of
host country inventors involved in an R&D project,
the greater the probability that one of them will
leak proprietary knowledge to a competitor. We
can think of host country inventors as the weaker
links in a chain—since they are more likely to
lead to IP leakage than home country inventors. As
the number of weaker links in a chain increases,
the more likely the chain breaks. Thus, in sum,
involving host country inventors can reduce costs,
but can also increase IP leakage. The goal of an
MNE R&D manager is to minimize the total cost
of an innovation by optimally choosing the number
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 1715–1733 (2016)
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of host and home country inventors for a focal R&D
project.
This is a significant concern for MNE managers
considering offshore R&D activities. For example,
a manager of a large global pharmaceutical com-
pany suggested that, with sensitive technologies like
sensors and wearables, fewer inventors are involved
from Asia compared to established R&D hubs in
the US because confidentiality and nondisclosure
agreements are relied upon more in the US than in
places like India or China. Another senior executive
of a cloud software-based startup headquartered in
the US suggested that “IP maturity” at host loca-
tions is a very prominent consideration when the
technology in question is “highly competitive” (i.e.,
is also of value to a competitor).
Since our goal is to examine how the extent of
involvement of host versus home inventors varies
with the strength of the IPR at the host location,
we state all our hypotheses in terms of the share of
host country inventors (Share), which is the number
of host inventors divided by the total number of
inventors, in an R&D project. This choice reflects
what we had discovered in our field work.
Effect of the strength of the IPR at the host
location on the share of host inventors
Consider an innovation that features a mix of home
and host country inventors. If personnel employed
by the focal MNE are hired away by competitors,
the focal MNE will likely risk losing two types
of knowledge: (1) competitors can expropriate the
focal MNE’s proprietary IP held as trade secrets,
and (2) employees hired away by competitors can
facilitate imitation by inventing around the MNE’s
patents by leaking proprietary tacit knowledge.
Strong IPRs constrain employee mobility and also
provide better legal recourse to prevent competitors
from infringing patents, thereby protecting both
patents and trade secrets from expropriation. In
contrast, host locations with a weak IPR protect
neither patents nor trade secrets.
Therefore, all else being equal, a weaker IPR
at the host location increases the likelihood of
knowledge leakage and therefore increases the cost
of involving host inventors in an R&D project. At
partial equilibrium, this should result in a decrease
in the number of host scientists involved in an
R&D project, consequently increasing the number
of home scientists. In essence, this implies that the
proportion of host scientists in a patent should be
lower when IPRs are weaker at the host location.
We formally state this as the following baseline
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The share of host inventors in an
R&D project is lower when the strength of the
IPR at the host location is weak than when it is
strong.
Joint effect of host location IPR
and innovation’s intended end-use location
The literature suggests two broad objectives for
MNEs in offshore R&D. The first is to explore
new growth opportunities in host markets (Mans-
field, Teece, and Romero, 1979). The second is
to produce inexpensively innovations for the home
market (Kumar and Puranam, 2012; Zhao, 2006).
We refer to a project that is mainly relevant to the
host location as a host R&D project and a project
that is mainly relevant for the MNE’s home mar-
ket as a home R&D project. We now investigate
whether the focal project being a home versus a
host R&D project modifies the effect of the strength
of the IPR at the host location on host inventor
participation.
Exploiting growth opportunities in host markets
requires an MNE to invest in R&D that tailors
its existing products or creates new products that
cater to the preferences of the customers in the host
market. Appropriating value from these innovations
mainly depends on the strength of the IPR at the
host location. A stronger IPR in the host location
enables the MNE to reduce competition for this
innovation in the hostmarket. Recall that theweaker
the IPR at the host location, the greater the risk of IP
leakage there. All else being equal, this means that
employing additional host inventors from a weak
IPR host country becomes more expensive when
compared to employing additional host inventors
from a strong IPR host country. Therefore, the
focal MNE is likely to involve fewer host inventors
from weak IPR host locations and consequently
more home inventors in projects aimed at that
host market than comparable projects conducted in
strong IPR locations. Therefore, we propose the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The share of host inventors in a
host R&D project is lower when the host location
has a weak IPR than when it has a strong IPR.
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 1715–1733 (2016)
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The subsidiaries of MNEs in host countries
perform R&D for the home market as well as
for the host market. In a home R&D project, an
MNE’s proprietary IP that is patented at home is
protected by the home country’s strong IPR. Thus,
even if an MNE employee at the host location
defects to a competitor, the strong IPR in the home
country enables the MNE to seek redress against
the infringement of patented knowledge. Patent
rights are territorial and are normally confined to
the country in which the patent is filed. Therefore,
the strength of the host country’s IPR is unlikely
to have a significant impact on protecting patented
innovations at home.
However, this does not imply that the threat
of leakage in a home R&D project is zero. The
strength of patents is only one aspect of an IPR,
the other being the strength of trade secrets. When
the host destination IPR does not protect unpatented
knowledge, competitors can hire away employees
to work around the focal firm’s patents or leapfrog
it, which can affect the focal MNE’s ability to
appropriate value from its IP.
Leakage of tacit knowledge in a weak IPR
host location is a more severe problem for value
appropriation in host projects than in home projects
for two reasons. First, knowledge relevant to the
host market is likely to be of interest to domestic
firms as well as other MNEs that compete in that
market. In contrast, knowledge that is relevant to
the home market is likely to be of interest only
to firms that are present in the host location but
compete in the home market. There are likely to
be many more firms present in the host location
that compete in the host market than those that
can compete in the home market. In addition, in
order to compete effectively in the home market,
these competitors, especially emerging market
multinationals, need to overcome their liability
of foreignness in the focal MNE’s home market.
In contrast, it is the focal MNE that needs to
overcome the liability of foreignness in the host
market.
Therefore, ceteris paribus, fewer host inventors
from a weak IPR location are likely to be involved
in projects aimed at the host market than in projects
aimed at the home market.
Hypothesis 3a: In a host location with a weak
IPR, the share of host inventors is lower in a host
R&D project than in a home R&D project.
In contrast to a host location with a weak IPR, a
host location with a strong IPR provides safeguards
against the leakage of both patented and unpatented
knowledge. Consequently, we argue in Hypothesis
2 above that the involvement of host inventors in a
host R&D project is likely to be higher in strong IPR
locations than in weak IPR locations. In addition,
the arguments above for Hypothesis 3a suggest that
the relative expropriation threat for a home R&D
project is lower than for a host R&D project. This
is true regardless of whether the host country has
a strong or a weak IPR, because the protection of
home R&D projects depends primarily on the home
country’s IPR and the strength of the host country’s
IPR plays a smaller role in whether home R&D
projects are expropriated. Combining the arguments
from Hypotheses 2 and 3a suggests that, relative
to a weak IPR host location, in a strong IPR host
location, the difference in expropriation threat for
a home R&D project versus that for a host R&D
project is unlikely to be very large. This suggests the
following differences-in-differences hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3b: The relative reduction in the
share of host inventors in a host R&D project
compared to that in a home R&D project is
greater when the R&D project is performed in a
weak IPR host location than in a strong IPR host
location.
DATA AND MEASURES
We test our hypotheses using a sample of patents
assigned to MNEs headquartered in the United
States (US assignees) but with at least one patent
invented either exclusively or partially outside of
the United States (in 1 of the 43 host countries listed
in Table 1). Our unit of observation is a patent. In
order to identify foreign invented patents, we used
the same criteria as Zhao (2006); i.e., we include
only host countries that have more than 2million
residents, more than one percent tertiary school
enrollment rates, and greater than five patents filed
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) in the 1990s. For a US assignee to be in
our sample, it must have at least one granted patent
in the USPTO that was exclusively invented or coin-
vented in 1 of these 43 countries between 1974 and
2009. Similar to Zhao (2006), patents held by local
subsidiaries are aggregated up to the headquarters.
We assembled our sample from two sources: from
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Table 1. Details of the sample used in this study
Description N
Total patents held by US assignees that
had at least one offshore patent
between 1974 and 2009
7,126,632
Total patents after matching offshore
and nonoffshore patents
5,062,701
Total patents after matching patents
coinvented in a weak IPR with those
that were coinvented in a strong IPR
(final sample)
2,915,144
Total offshore patents 838,160
Total nonoffshore patents 2,076,984
Notes: The host countries in our sample include the following
43 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt,
France, Germany, Greece, HongKong, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korean Republic, Malaysia, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portu-
gal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, U.K., Ukraine. The unmatched
sample additionally includes the following four host countries that
our matching procedure eliminated: Thailand, Peru, Pakistan and
Venezuela.
the PATSTAT database (Wagner, Hoisl, and Thoma,
2014), we assembled all patents that belonged to US
assignees that satisfied our sampling criteria. Sec-
ond, we used COMPUSTAT to gather time varying
firm attributes for the US assignees in our sample.
We use two sources of variation to test our
hypotheses. The first is variation in the strength
of IPR in the host country in which a patent was
invented. We classified these 43 offshore destina-
tions at which a patent was coinvented as having
either a weak IPR or a strong IPR based on table 1 of
Zhao (2006: 1189). We compared patents produced
wholly or partially by inventors residing in a weak
IPR host country with similar patents that were
wholly or partially produced by inventors residing
in a strong IPR host country.
The second is the country in which the patent
was filed. Here we compare home patents—patents
filed in the USA—with host patents—patents filed
in the same host country in which they were exclu-
sively or jointly produced. Since most patenting is
driven by trade or competition considerations, the
patent filing location is a good proxy for whether
the R&D project is relevant to the home market or
the host market (Yang and Nai-Fong, 2008). When
the same patent was filed in multiple countries, we
included the patent only once and classified it as
described above.
Offshore patents can vary systematically in a
variety of dimensions from patents that are not off-
shore. Moreover, patents coinvented in a host coun-
try with a weak IPR can differ systematically from
those coinvented in a host country with a strong
IPR. To minimize the possibility that our results
are driven by differences between patents that are
unrelated to our hypotheses, we construct a matched
sample of patents based on a set of observable patent
characteristics. For this purpose, we use coarsened
exact matching (CEM) technique to construct a
matched sample of patents. CEM is useful for min-
imizing any sample selection bias and also reduces
the sensitivity of the regression results to specific
functional form assumptions (Azoulay, Graf-Zivin,
and Wang, 2010; Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012;
Singh and Agrawal, 2011).
We implement CEM at two levels. First, for every
offshore patent (i.e., coinvented or fully invented in
a host country), we find an equivalent nonoffshore
(i.e., exclusively US-invented) patent. We match
these patents based on assignee, application year,
and main IPC class and use coarsened matching on
observable characteristics, including the number
of inventors, the ratio of backward self-citations
of patents produced at the MNE’s headquarters to
total backward citations (backward ratio), the ratio
of forward self-citations of patents produced at the
MNE’s headquarters to total forward citations (for-
ward ratio) and the number of claims. We used this
subsample to match patents invented in a host coun-
try with a strong IPR with patents invented in a host
country with a weak IPR using the same criteria.1
As shown in Table 1, we start with 7,126,632
patents held byUS assignees that meet our sampling
criteria, which we then match in two steps, as
described above. Descriptive statistics suggest that
the differences in observable characteristics are
significantly reduced after matching. However, in
addition to matching, we further control for any
remaining differences by adding the observable
patent characteristics as controls in our regressions.
Table 2 shows our final sample’s composition by
inventor country and filing country IPR strength.
1 We are mindful that matching between the treatment and control
groups is based only on observable characteristics and therefore
does not fully eliminate endogeneity concerns. However, to the
extent that unobservable and observable parameters are correlated
with each other, matching enables us to minimize the possibility
that our results are driven by unobservable differences between
patents (Iacus et al., 2012). We thank a reviewer for pointing out
this shortcoming of the matching procedure.
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Table 2. Patents, by offshore and filing locations
Offshore location
Weak Strong Offshore total Not offshore Total
Filed only in the US 195,940 191,718 387,658 1,121,113 1,508,771
Filed only in Host 40,446 152,484 192,930 131,109 324,039
Filed at Both 24,959 91,294 116,253 775,020 891,273
Filed at Neither 89,851 51,468 141,319 49,742 191,061
Total patents 351,196 486,964 838,160 2,076,984 2,915,144
Notes: Offshore location weak includes patents that have one or more inventors residing at a weak IPR location. Offshore location strong
includes patents that have one or more inventors residing at a strong IPR location.
Not offshore patents only have inventors residing in the US. A total of 35,511 patents were produced in a weak as well as a strong host.
In this case, we classify the host country as either strong or weak based on whether the maximum number of inventors on the patent
was from a host country with a strong or a weak IPR. There were 5,669 patents in which there was a tie in number of inventors from
host locations with a weak and a strong IPR. We considered such patents as having been invented in a host location with a weak IPR.
Alternatively, dropping these 30,511 patents that were produced in a weak and a strong host country does not qualitatively alter our
results.
The filed in host category comprises patents that were filed exclusively at the offshore location. The category Filed at both comprises
patents that were filed both in the US and at the offshore location and the Filed at Neither category comprises patents that were filed
neither in the US nor at the offshore location but elsewhere.
Weak IPR host destinations include the following 27 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Egypt,
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korean Republic, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine. Strong IPR host destinations include the following 16 countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore,
Sweden, U.K.
Table 1 provides the details of the sample used
in this study. Table 2, shows that 58.1 percent of the
offshore patents were filed in a host location with
a strong IPR. Moreover, in our sample, more off-
shore patents were filed at home than at the host
location, especially when developed in weak IPR
locations. For patents developed in a strong IPR
location, 39.4 percent were filed at home whereas
31.3 percent were filed at host; for patents devel-
oped at a weak IPR location, 55.8 percent were filed
at home whereas 11.5 percent were filed at host.
Dependent variable
Share of host inventors
The key dependent variable is the proportion of
host inventors in a focal patent, Share, which is
measured as the number of inventors from the host
location divided by the total number of inventors
listed in the patent. If these counts—namely, the
number of host or total number of inventors for the
same patent—vary across patent offices in which
they were filed, we take the maximum. However,
it is plausible that the effect of the IPR on the
participation of host inventors is not a continuum.
We check our results in the robustness section by
redefining our different dependent variable based on
different thresholds.
Independent variables
Strength of the IPR at the host location
It is difficult to devise a perfect measure of the
strength of a country’s IPR (Arora, 2009). Since
there is no perfect measure, we test our hypotheses
using a variety of proxies for the strength of the IPR
in the host country.
Our primary method to identify the strength of
the IPR is through the use of the variation in the
location of an offshore patent. To this end, we
follow the classification provided by Zhao (2006:
1189). We create two dummy variables, weak,
which equals 1 if the offshore patent was produced
in a host country with a weak IPR and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, we use another dummy variable, strong,
which equals 1 if the offshore patent was produced
in a host country with a strong IPR and 0 otherwise.
Following the literature, we classify patents as
originating from weak or strong IPR locations
depending on whether the maximum number of
inventors is from a weak or strong IPR country.
However, since this source of variation exclu-
sively relies on differences between host countries,
this empirical strategy can potentially pick up other
unobserved differences between host countries that
are orthogonal to differences in IPR strength. As an
alternative, we test the robustness of our principal
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results using a standardized measure of the IPR
index of Ginarte and Park (1997), which varies by
both country and time (index henceforth) and is
measured over five-year intervals (Park, 2008). This
allows us to control additionally for other unob-
served differences between host countries in our
regressions.2
Location for which the invention is relevant
We use the variation in filing location as a proxy
for the country in which the focal patent is relevant.
Conditional on a patent being offshore, we define
four dummy variables to classify a patent into four
mutually exclusive categories. To proxy for a home
R&D project, we use Filed only in the US, which
equals 1 if the patent was filed exclusively with the
US patent office andwas produced in a host country.
The proxy for a host R&D project is Filed only in
Host, which equals 1 if the patent was only filed
in the same host country in which it was produced
or coproduced. Filed in Both equals 1 if the patent
was produced in the host location and filed in
both the home and host locations. Filed in Neither
equals 1 if the patent was coproduced in the host




We control for the R&D intensity of the assignee
firm of the focal patent measured as the firm’s R&D
budget divided by its total sales for that year. We
lack thismeasure for about 4.9 percent of the sample
since the relevant data are not available. We control
for missing values by using R&D not reported
dummy, which equals 1 if the data is missing.
2 Consistent with our scheme of classifying offshore patents as
invented in either a weak or a strong host country, when a patent
is offshore in multiple countries, the value that index takes for that
patent is the value that relates to the host country with the highest
number of inventors. When there was a tie between two or more
countries in the number of inventors, we assigned theweighted (by
the number of inventors from that country) average of the index for
those countries.
3 These classifications take into account all subsequent filings of
a Patent Cooperation Treaty patent until 2012. Our sample also
includes patents that are filed at the host location but have no
host inventors. They are part of the omitted category of patents
produced exclusively in the US. Our results are unchanged if
we redefine these categories purely based on filing location,
regardless of whether they were offshore.
Size
We control for the size of the assignee firm using
the number of employees (as a log, henceforth log
size) of the focal MNE. Similar to R&D intensity,
we lack this measure for about 4.9 percent of our
sample, which we control for by using R&D not
reported dummy.
Innovation complexity
We control for an innovation’s complexity by using
the number of claims on the focal patent (as a log,
henceforth, log claims). In our regressions, we
control for missing data using claims not found
dummy, which equals 1 when claims for the patent
are missing.4
Forward ratio
We control for the extent to which the focal inno-
vation is useful to the innovating firm by using the
ratio of the number of forward self-citations by
patents produced at the headquarters to the total
number of forward citations of the focal patent
(forward ratio).5
Backward ratio
We control for the extent to which the focal patent
uses prior knowledge from the MNE by using the
ratio of backward self-citations to patents produced
at the headquarters to the total number of backward
citations of each patent (backward ratio).
Originality and generality
We control for a patent’s originality and generality,
using the patent measures of originality and
generality.
4 Wewere unable to collect the number of claims for 9.5 percent of
the sample because they were missing in the PATSTAT database.
Most of these patents (about 56%) were filed before 1990. In cases
in which the same patent was filed in different countries with
a differing number of claims, we took the maximum number of
claims across the filing countries as the number of claims for that
patent.
5 When the patent was filed in multiple countries, we collected the
total number of unique citations made to and by the patent in all
the filing countries. However, not all countries make the citation
details available to the general public. When the focal patent was
filed only in a country that does not publicly disclose citation data,
we assigned that focal patent the average forward and backward
ratios that is relevant to the focal patent’s grant year and main
technology class cohort. This constitutes about 3.9 percent of the
data.
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Industry dummies
The utility of patents and the propensity to
file them can vary across industries (Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). We control for such
industry-specific effects using industry dummies
constructed by mapping each patent to a three-digit
SIC code using the 2005 IPC–SIC concordance
of the USPTO (available at http://www.uspto.
gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/brochure.htm, last
accessed June 15, 2015). Using this classification,
we include 28 two-digit SIC code fixed effects to
control for any industry effects.
Time dummies
We control for filing year effects using 35 dummies,
one each for 1974–2009.
Firm dummies
We control for firm-specific effects using 58,811
firm fixed effects.
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for all of
the independent variables.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We begin with a nonparametric analysis of the
data. In Table 4, we analyze how the share of host
inventors in a patent (Share) varies with the filing
location and the location in which the patent was
coinvented. In line with Hypothesis 1, regardless of
filing location, patents that were coinvented in a host
country with a weak IPR, have a lower Share than
patents coinvented in a host country with a strong
IPR. We also see that, among patents filed in the
same host location as they were invented, Share is
lower for patents that were coinvented and filed in
that host location (“filed only in host”) with a weak
IPR relative to patents coinvented and filed in a host
location that has a stronger IPR (diff. -0.33, p-value
<0.01), supporting Hypothesis 2. In addition, we
see that the Share on a “filed in both” category
patent is lower than that of the other two categories.
Thus, to the extent that filed in both encompasses the
IPR threat for both home and host R&D projects,
Share in this category of patents is likely to be
the lower than filed only in the US or filed only in
host patents. Among patents coinvented in a host
country with a weak IPR, those filed only in the
host country have a lower share than those filed
in home (diff. -0.28, p-value <0.01), supporting
Hypothesis 3a. In contrast, this difference in share
between host and home patents coinvented in a
country with a strong IPR is only -0.06. Supporting
Hypothesis 3b, we also find that the difference in
Share between “filed only in host” and “filed only
in the US” patents is higher for patents coinvented
in a host country with a weak IPR than for patents
coinvented in a host country with a strong IPR (diff.
−0.22, p-value <0.01). The nonparametric analysis
does not control for various other factors that might
influence these differences. Accordingly, we turn to
regressions.
In Table 5, we start by exploring how the strength
of the IPR at a host location influences Share.
To identify this effect, we estimate fixed effects
specifications by including the dummies that iden-
tify patents invented in a host country that has a
weak IPR (weak dummy) and patents invented in a
host country that has a strong IPR (strong dummy).
The omitted category comprises patents that were
invented exclusively in the USA, for which the
Share is zero by definition. Thus, we estimate how
the Share on a patent p that belongs to an i offshore
assignee to a host location type m filed at location
type k at time t in technological class j varies by
the location type at which the focal patent was coin-
vented as follows:
Shareijmktp = 𝛽0 + 𝛼1Weakm + 𝛼2Strongm + 𝜃iXi
+ 𝜃jYj + 𝜃t𝜏t + 𝜃p𝜆p + 𝜀ijmktp (1)
where Xi is a vector of assignee characteristics
that include assignee fixed effects; Yj is a vector
of technology characteristics that include industry
fixed effects; 𝜏 t is a vector of time effects that
include filing year dummies; and 𝜆p includes
a vector of other patent characteristics such as
the number of claims, originality, generality and
forward and backward ratios. Our dependent
variable is a proportion, which varies between
zero and one. We use, a fixed effects specifi-
cation and estimate how changes in host IPR
across patents within a firm influences changes
the Share.
In Table 5, specification 1, along with the main
independent variables of interest, we include
35 filing year dummies, 58,811 assignee fixed
effects, and 28 two-digit SIC code dummies. In
addition, we include controls that vary by both
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Table 3. Descriptions of measures
Variable Description Source of variation N Mean Std. dev.
Share Number of offshore inventors








Weak = 1 if the focal patent was filed
to a host country with a weak
IPR and 0 otherwise
Host location 2,915,144 0.11 0.24
Strong = 1 if the focal patent was filed
to a host country with a
strong IPR and 0 otherwise
Host location 2,915,144 0.17 0.28
Filed only in US = 1 if the patent was coinvented
in a host country and filed
exclusively in the US and 0
otherwise
Filing location 2,915,144 0.11 0.29
Filed only in
Host
= 1 if a patent was coinvented in
a host country and filed
exclusively in the same host
country, and 0 otherwise




= 1 if the patent was coinvented
in a host country and filed
both in the US and at the host
destination, and 0 otherwise
Filing location 2,915,144 0.06 0.21
Filed in Neither
(US or Host)
= 1 if the focal patent was
coinvented in host country
and filed neither in the US
nor at the host destination,
and 0 otherwise
Filing location 2,915,144 0.05 0.25
Backward ratio Number of backward
self-citations divided by the
total number of backward
citations
Patent 2,801,531a 0.36 0.55
Forward ratio Number of forward
self-citations divided by the
total number of forward
citations
Patent 2,801,531a 0.47 0.57
Industry
dummies





35 dummies, 1 for each year




58,811 firm fixed effects Firm -
Originality Originality of a patent Patent 2,801,531a 0.57 0.51
Generality Generality of a patent Patent 2,801,531a 0.55 0.49
Log claims Natural log of the number of
claims on a patent
Patent 2,772,302b 2.31 2.91
R&D over sales Yearly assignee R&D divided
by sales
Firm, year 2,772,302c 0.03 0.79
Log(employees) Number of assignee employees
in a year
Firm, year 2,772,302c 1.91 2.28
a We were not able to calculate the forward and backward ratios for 3.9% of the sample. For these patents, we assigned the average ratio
relating to Indian patents for the filing year cohort.
b We were unable to obtain the number of claims for 9.5% of the observations. In regressions, we control for missing values using a
dummy that equals 1 when the number of claims was missing for the patent.
c For 4.9% of the sample, we were unable to obtain R&D expenditure and employees. In our regressions we control for the missing values
that occur in both these cases using a dummy that equals 1 when the R&D or employees was missing for the patent.
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Weak 0.80 0.52 0.49 −0.28*** (H3a)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Strong 0.91 0.85 0.79 −0.06***




−0.11*** (H1) −0.33*** (H1, H2) −0.30*** −0.22*** (H3b)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively
Standard errors are in parentheses.
assignees and time, using R&D over sales and
log size along with our control for missing data.
In specification 2, we further control for patent
characteristics using forward ratio, backward
ratio, and log claims. In specification 3, we
additionally control for a patent’s originality and
generality.
Hypothesis 1 argues that more host inventors
from strong IPR locations are likely to be involved
than host inventors from weak IPR locations in
otherwise similar R&D projects, or 𝛼1 – 𝛼2 < 0.
From Table 5, specification 1, we see that, the
difference in coefficients for weak and strong is
about -0.11 (p-value <0.01). Specifications 2 and
3 suggest that further controlling for other observ-
able patent characteristics does not change our
results much. Table 5 suggests that the reduc-
tion in the number of host inventors on an off-
shore R&D project to host locations with a weak
IPR when compared to a similar offshore R&D
project at host locations with a strong IPR is
between 13 and 15 percent.6 These results support
Hypothesis 1.
To test Hypotheses 2, 3a, and 3b, we utilize
variation in location at which the focal patent was
coinvented as well as the location(s) at which the
6 Calculated as follows: From Spec. 1, a share of 0.71 for an
offshore patent invented in a weak IPR host location implies that
the total number of host inventors are about 0.71× 2.63= 1.87,
where 2.63 is the average number of inventors in an offshore
patent. Similarly a share of 0.82 on strong IPR offshore patents
implies that the total number of host inventors are about 2.16. Thus
the difference is about 0.29 or 13 percent (0.29/2.16 × 100).
patent was filed. We estimate
Shareijkmtp = 𝛽0 + 𝛼1Weakm + 𝛽1WeakmXFiledUSk
+ 𝛽2WeakmXFiledHostk
+ 𝛽3FiledUSk + 𝛽4FiledHostk
+ 𝛽5FiledBothk + 𝛽6FiledNeitherk
+ 𝜃iXi + 𝜃jYj + 𝜃t𝜏t + 𝜃p𝜆p + 𝜀ijkmtp
(2)
The omitted category comprises patents that were
not filed offshore, in which, by definition, the
proportion of host inventors is zero. Recall that
we defined the categories Filed only in the US,
Filed only in Host, Filed in Both, and Filed in
Neither conditional on an offshore patent. There-
fore, the interaction effects Weakm ×FiledUSk and
Weakm ×FiledHostk identify the additional influ-
ence of a host country with a weak IPR over
and above that of a host country with a strong
IPR on patents that are Filed only in the US and
on patents Filed only in Host, respectively. In
Equation 2 above, 𝛽3 estimates the Share on home
R&D projects and 𝛽4 estimates the Share on host
R&D projects for offshore projects in a host country
with a strong IPR. When the IPR is weak at the host
location, 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 estimates share on a home
R&D project and 𝛼1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽4 estimates share on a
host R&D project. The results are shown in specifi-
cation 4 of Table 5.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that share for a host R&D
project is lower when the IPR at the host location is
weak than when it is strong; given that the share
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Table 5. Effect of IPR strength at the host location on the share of host inventors using Equations 1 and 2
Spec.1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
Weak 𝛼1 0.71 (0.00)*** 0.68 (0.00)*** 0.66 (0.00)*** −0.05 (0.00)***
Weak× filed only in US 𝛽1 −0.09 (0.00)***
Weak× filed only in Host 𝛽2 −0.30 (0.00)***
Strong 𝛼2 0.82 (0.00)*** 0.79 (0.00)*** 0.78 (0.00)***
Filed only in the US 𝛽3 0.83 (0.00)***
Filed only in Host 𝛽4 0.79 (0.00)***
Filed in Both (US and Host) 𝛽5 0.73 (0.00)***
Filed in Neither (US or Host) 𝛽6 0.84 (0.00)***
Forward ratio 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.00)***
Backward ratio −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.01 (0.00)*** −0.03 (0.00)***
(1-no claims)× log claims −0.05 (0.00)*** −0.04 (0.00)*** −0.03 (0.00)*** −0.02 (0.00)***
Claims not found dummy 0.01 (0.00)* 0.01 (0.00)* 0.01 (0.00)* 0.02 (0.01)*
Originality −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.02 (0.00)***
Generality −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.03 (0.00)***
R&D over sales 0.01 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.00)***
R&D not found dummy −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02)
Log (employees) −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.01 (0.01)**
Constant 0.01 (0.04) 0.00 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.05)
N 2,915,144 2,915,144 2,915,144 2,915,144
Assignee fixed effects (58,811) Y Y Y Y
Two-digit SIC code dummies (28) Y Y Y Y
Filing year dummies (35) Y Y Y Y
Within R-squared 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57
Test for H1: (𝜶1 – 𝜶2) −0.11 (0.00)*** −0.11 (0.00)*** −0.12 (0.00)***
Test for H2: 𝜶1 + 𝜷2 −0.35 (0.00)***
Test for H3a:
(𝜶1 + 𝜷2 + 𝜷4) – (𝜶1 + 𝜷1 + 𝜷3)
−0.25 (0.01)***
Test for H3b: (𝜷2 – 𝜷1) −0.21 (0.01)***
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively
Standard errors are in parentheses. Patents that are exclusively invented in the United States are the omitted category. Test for H3b:
{[(𝛼1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽4) – (𝛼1 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽3)] – (𝛽4 – 𝛽3)}= (𝛽2 – 𝛽1).
on a host R&D project when the IPR at the host
location is weak is 𝛼1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽4 and share when the
IPR at the host location is strong is just 𝛽4, that
difference is 𝛼1 + 𝛽2 < 0. From specification 4 in
Table 5, we find that this difference is -0.35 (std.
err. 0.00, p-value <0.01) supporting Hypothesis 2.
This suggests that the number of host inventors
on host R&D offshore projects to weak IPR host
locations is about 44 percent lower than in similar
R&D offshore projects to host locations with a
strong IPR.
Similarly, Hypothesis 3a suggests that when
the IPR is weak at a host location, the share is
lower on a host R&D project than on a home R&D
project. In Equation 2 above, as noted earlier,
when Weakm = 1, share for a host R&D project
is 𝛼1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽4. From spec 4 in Table 5, we see
that this is 0.34 (std. err. 0.00). When Weakm = 1,
Share for a home R&D project is 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽3,
which is 0.69 (std. err. 0.00). The difference
(𝛼1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽4) – (𝛼1 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽3)= -0.35 (std. err.
0.00, p-value <0.01), or about 36 percent. This
supports Hypothesis 3a.
Hypothesis 3b argues that the relative reduc-
tion in share between a host R&D project
and a home R&D project when Weakm = 1 is
greater than a similar reduction when Weakm = 0.
Stated otherwise, the test for Hypothesis 3b is
{(𝛼1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽4) – (𝛼1 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽3)} – (𝛽4 – 𝛽3)< 0,
or just (𝛽2 – 𝛽1)< 0. Table 5 suggests that
𝛽2 – 𝛽1 = -0.21 (std. err. 0.02, p-value <0.01),
supporting Hypothesis 3b. The relative reduction
in host vs. home projects is about 31 percent when
Weak= 1. However the reduction in the number
of host inventors in host vs. home patents when
Weak= 0 is only five percent. Thus the relative
reduction in the number of host inventors between
a host and a home R&D project is about 26 percent
higher at a host location with a weak IPR when
compared to a host location with a strong IPR.
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Hypotheses 3a–b are the key hypotheses that
test our contribution. Specifically, we argue for the
counterintuitive proposition that when a host coun-
try’s IPR is weak, the share of host inventors is
likely to be lower in a host R&D project compared
to a home R&D project, even though the host inven-
tors are likely to know more about the host mar-
ket. Similar to Singh and Agrawal (2011), we also
matched patents across countries on observables. To
the extent that observable and unobservable char-
acteristics correlate, which is the principle underly-
ing the coarsened exact matching (CEM) approach
(Iacus et al., 2012), it is unlikely that our results
are exclusively driven by unobserved differences
between patents produced in host countries with a
weak IPR versus strong IPR.
In addition, our key hypotheses do not rely on
a direct comparison between patents produced in
weak IPR versus strong IPR countries. Hypotheses
3a–b, are differences-in-differences tests that
compare share on patents invented by host country
inventors belonging to the same assignee from the
same location type (weak versus strong), in the
same year and technology class, but are filed at
home (the USA) as opposed to being filed at the
host location. Therefore, to the extent that host
location type-specific effects, firm-specific effects
or temporal dynamics affect offshore patents in a
host destination in a similar manner, differencing
these coefficients should remove these unobserv-
able differences that persist even after matching.
This provides us some confidence that the iden-
tified effects relate to our hypotheses rather than
being driven by unobservable differences between
patents, host countries or filing year cohorts,
although we cannot rule out these possibilities.
Robustness checks
Controlling for unobserved differences between
countries—results using index
As argued above, it is plausible that our results
are merely picking up other differences between
host countries with weak and strong IPR. We
hence replicate our results using an alternative
measure of the IPR. For this purpose, we use
“index,” the measure of strength of IPR pro-
vided on a five-yearly basis in Park (2008).
Since index varies by both host location and
time, we now control for unobserved differences
between host countries by using 43 host country
dummies. Specification 1, of Table 6 estimates
Shareijkmtp = 𝛼0 + 𝜆1Indexmt + 𝜃iXi + 𝜃jYj + 𝜃t𝜏 t
+ 𝜃p𝜆p + 𝜃mKm + 𝜀ijkmtp where 𝜃m denotes host
country fixed effects while the other parameters are
as described in Equation 1. Our results show that
one standard deviation increase in index (increasing
IPR strength) is associated with about nine percent
more host inventors, supporting Hypothesis 1.
Specification 2 of Table 6 estimates Shareijkmtp
= 𝛼0 + 𝜆1Indexmt + 𝛾2Index *FiledUSk + 𝛾3Indexmt
*FiledHostk + 𝛽4FiledUSk + 𝛽5FiledHostk + 𝛽6
FiledBothk + 𝛽7FiledNeitherk + 𝜃iXi + 𝜃jYj + 𝜃t𝜏 t
+ 𝜃p𝜆p + 𝜃mKm + 𝜀ijkmtp to test Hypotheses 2–3b.
Hypothesis 2 is also supported: the number of
host inventors on a host R&D project is about
48 percent more when conducted at a host location
with a strong IPR compared to a weak IPR. More-
over, the number of host inventors for host R&D
projects is about 31 percent lower than for home
R&D projects, when the IPR at the host location
is weak, supporting Hypothesis 3a. Finally, the
increase in index increases the number of host
inventors by about 19 percent more for host R&D
projects relative to home R&D projects, supporting
Hypothesis 3b.
Results using the number of offshore inventors
as the dependent variable
We defined our dependent variable as the share of
host inventors in a patent, taking the approach that
the greater the share of knowledge for a given inno-
vation available in the host country, the greater the
likely loss from leakage. However, it is plausible
that the absolute level of involvement of host inven-
tors rather than the relative level may better capture
the leakage threat. To check this, we redefine our
dependent variable as the log of 1 plus the num-
ber of host inventors involved in a patent. We run
two specifications, with and without controlling for
the inventing team’s size. Table 7 shows that all our
hypotheses are supported.
Results using other dependent variables to proxy
the extent to which a patent is offshore
We also checked if our results are sensitive to the
fact that the effect of the IPR on share may not be
a continuum. For this purpose, we tested our results
by dichotomizing our dependent variable based on
different kinds of thresholds, such as whether the
patent is exclusively invented offshore, or whether
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Table 6. Replicating results using Index as a time-varying measure of IPR strength in the host destinations
Spec. 1 Spec. 2
Index 𝝀1 0.08 (0.00)*** 0.16 (0.00)***
Index×filed only in the US 𝜸2 0.01 (0.00)***
Index×filed only in Host 𝜸3 0.22 (0.01)***
Filed only in the US 𝛽4 0.73 (0.00)***
Filed only in Host 𝛽5 0.69 (0.00)***
Filed in Both (US and Host) 𝛽6 0.68 (0.00)***
Filed in Neither 𝛽7 0.82 (0.00)***
Forward ratio 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.01 (0.00)***
Backward ratio −0.03 (0.00)*** −0.03 (0.00)***
(1-no claims)× log claims −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.02 (0.00)***
Claims not found dummy 0.01 (0.00)* 0.01 (0.00)*
Originality −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.02 (0.00)***
Generality −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.01 (0.00)***
R&D over sales 0.01 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01)***
R&D not found dummy −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02)
Log(employees) −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.02 (0.00)***
Constant 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01)
N 2,915,144 2,915,144
Host country dummies 43 43
Assignee fixed effects (58,811) Y Y
Two-digit SIC code dummies (28) Y Y
Filing year dummies (35) Y Y
Within R-squared 0.78 0.79
Test for H1: 𝝀1 > 0 0.08 (0.00)***
Test for H2: 𝜸3 > 0 0.22 (0.01)***
Test for H3a: (𝜷5 – 𝜷4) <0 −0.04 (0.01)***
Test for H3b: (𝜸3 – 𝜸2) >0 0.21 (0.02)***
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively
Standard errors are in parentheses. Note that index at home country only varies with filing year and hence is omitted given that filing
year dummies have been included in the regressions. Patents that are exclusively invented in the US are the omitted category.
the patent has a higher number of offshore inventors
than the sample median. Finally, we also estimated
a tobit specification that allows the distribution of
Share to be concentrated around 0 and 1, while the
rest of it is assumed to be distributed normally. All
our hypotheses are supported in these tests.7
Results using an alternative sample
In addition, all our hypotheses held when we tested
the robustness of our results by relying on the
recently implemented patent reforms in India to
redefine whether the patent is invented in host loca-
tion with a strong or a weak IPR. This specification
has a few advantages: it includes patents from the
Indian patent office that are not included in the
PATSTAT dataset, for which we have more in-depth
information. For example, in this sample, claims
7 The results for these and subsequent robustness checks are
reported in the Appendix S1.
are missing for only about three percent of the
patents. Moreover, India strengthened the patent
law for agricultural and pharmaceutical patents in
1994 and for other sectors in 2004, which provides
us with an alternate, possibly exogenous measure
to capture the strength of patents in a host country.
This alternate sample comprised of 53,320 matched
patents that belong to US-based assignees that were
produced either exclusively in the US or offshore
in the UK or India. We tested our hypotheses by
using patents invented in India post-reform as the
strong IPR sample, and those invented pre-reform
as the weak IPR sample. We follow Lerner (2009)
and Branstetter et al. (2006) and use UK-invented
patents as a control sample since the UK has had
a strong and stable IP regime for a long period of
time. We use a differences-in-differences estima-
tion to test our hypotheses in which we compare
the difference in Share on Indian-invented patents
between pre- and post-reform periods with the
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 37: 1715–1733 (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
Right Person in the Right Place 1729
Table 7. Replication of the results using the level of offshore inventor involvement - ln(1+ num of offshore inventors)
as the dependent variable (DV)
Without controls for team size With control for team size
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4
Weak 𝛼1 0.78 (0.00)*** −0.16 (0.00)*** 0.78 (0.00)*** −0.19 (0.00)***
Weak× filed only in US 𝛽1 −0.10 (0.00)*** −0.12 (0.00)***
Weak× filed only in Host 𝛽2 −0.25 (0.00)*** −0.22 (0.00)***
Strong 𝛼2 0.91 (0.00)*** 0.92 (0.00)***
Filed only in the US 𝛽3 0.96 (0.00)*** 0.95 (0.00)***
Filed only in Host 𝛽4 0.91 (0.01)*** 0.91 (0.01)***
Filed at Both (US and Host) 𝛽5 0.88 (0.00)*** 0.86 (0.00)***
Filed Neither 𝛽6 0.90 (0.00)*** 0.88 (0.00)***
Forward ratio 0.01 (0.00)** 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.01 (0.00)** 0.01 (0.00)***
Backward ratio −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.03 (0.00)*** −0.01 (0.00)***
(1-no claims)× log claims −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.01 (0.00)* −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.02 (0.00)***
Claims not found dummy 0.02 (0.01)** 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)***
Originality −0.01 (0.00)*** −0.01 (0.00)*** −0.02 (0.00)*** −0.02 (0.00)***
Generality −0.00 (0.00)*** −0.00 (0.00)*** −0.01 (0.00)*** −0.01 (0.00)***
R&D over sales 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.01 (0.00)***
R&D not found dummy −0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.02)
Log(employees) −0.01 (0.00)*** −0.01 (0.00)*** −0.01 (0.00)*** −0.02 (0.00)***
Log(1+ total inventors) 0.09 (0.00)*** 0.10 (0.00)***
Constant −0.03 (0.10) −0.01 (0.10) −0.06 (0.11) −0.00 (0.10)
N 2,915,144 2,915,144 2,915,144 2,915,144
Assignee fixed effects (58,811) Y Y Y Y
Two-digit SIC code dummies (28) Y Y Y Y
Filing year dummies (35) Y Y Y Y
Within R-squared 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57
Test for H1: (𝜶1 – 𝜶2) −0.13 (0.00)*** −0.14 (0.00)***
Test for H2: (𝜶1 + 𝜷2) −0.41 (0.00)*** −0.41 (0.00)***
Test for H3a:
(𝜶1 +𝜷2 +𝜷4) – (𝜶1 +𝜷1 +𝜷3)
−0.20 (0.01)*** −0.14 (0.01)***
Test for H3b: (𝜷2 – 𝜷1) −0.15 (0.00)*** −0.10 (0.00)***
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively
Standard errors are in parentheses. Test for H3b: {[(𝛼1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽4) – (𝛼1 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽3)] – (𝛽4 – 𝛽3)}= (𝛽2 – 𝛽1).
similar difference on UK-invented patents. All our
hypotheses are supported even in this sample.
Alternate method of classifying patents based
on their filing location
We tested whether our results are sensitive to our
classification of patents based on whether they were
offshore and their filing location. We also checked
whether the propensity to assign an offshore project
to weak vs. strong IPR host location is dependent
on the location of its end use or where the patent is
filed. For this purpose, we redefined the categories
filed only in USA, filed only in host, filed in
both and filed in neither unconditionally based
only on where the patent was filed. Using three
dependent variables based on whether a patent
filed in an offshore destination with a weak IPR
(weak), or a location with a strong IPR (strong)
or whether they were produced exclusively in the
USA, we implemented a set of seemingly unrelated
regressions with the patent filing locations as the
main explanatory variables. We find support for all
our hypotheses.
Other potential sources of bias
Our results, especially for Hypotheses 1 and 2, rely
on comparing the share for patents coinvented in
weak host locations versus the share for patents
coinvented in strong host location. It is plausible
that differences in share are driven by factors other
than the strength of the IPR at the host location. For
example, the differences in share may just reflect
the differential levels of integration of the sub-
sidiary with headquarters and subsidiaries located
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in strong IPR countries may be more integrated in
the MNE’s knowledge network relative to those in
weak IPR countries or that R&D collaboration with
the subsidiaries located in some countries could be
in different technological areas relative to others.
Through matching patents we have attempted
to mitigate these concerns. A related issue is
that our results may also reflect the changing
ability of subsidiaries to take on more complex
projects over time. Like much of the prior work
(Alnuaimi, George, and Puranam, 2012; Lahiri,
2010; Singh, 2008), we do not control for
time-varying subsidiary-specific effects. However,
as discussed earlier, Hypotheses 3a–b rely on the
difference between patents filed at home versus host
locations from within a host type and filing year
cohort. It is unlikely that the subsidiary’s ability
at an instance in time would differentially impact
home versus host R&D projects. This helps us
mitigate the likelihood of alternative explanations
that suggest that our results derive from systematic
differences in patents.
DISCUSSION
The internationalization of R&D activity by MNEs
has been an active topic of research for the past
50 years, with the pace of scholarly interest picking
up in the past 20 years, given the significant increase
in foreign R&D conducted by MNEs. Whereas
much prior work has discussed R&D international-
ization in the context of the most developed coun-
tries, such as the United States, Canada, Western
European countries, and Japan (Kuemmerle, 1999;
Rugman, Verbeke, and Nguyen, 2011), the most
recent and exciting trend is the growing presence
of emerging economies, such as China and India,
on the MNE R&D map (Alnuaimi et al., 2012;
Zhao, 2006). This recent trend presents MNE man-
agers with a trade-off. Whereas relatively inexpen-
sive labor costs at these destinations provide oppor-
tunities for cost arbitrage, the weak IPRs at these
destinations also makes the appropriability of IP a
challenge. It is from this perspective that our study
makes novel contributions.
We ask how the relative participation of inven-
tors from headquarters and the foreign subsidiary
of an MNE changes with the changing strength of
the IPR at the host location. Early studies argue that
R&D centers in host locations customize technolo-
gies developed at home to suit local market needs
(Mansfield et al., 1979). Later studies argue that
MNEs may also establish foreign R&D centers to
access specialized skills and technologies available
there that are perhaps not readily available at home
(Almeida, 1996; Kuemmerle, 1999). Understand-
ing the relative involvement of host inventors versus
headquarters inventors is important to understand
how MNE’s organize R&D internationally.
Our empirical investigation leads to two conclu-
sions. First, on average, fewer host inventors from
locations with a weaker IPR are involved in MNE
R&D projects. Second, the influence of the strength
of the host country’s IPR on the involvement of host
inventors is greater when the R&D is aimed at the
host market than when aimed at the home market.
Our results refine the findings from prior studies
on the influence of IPR strength on offshore R&D.
Unlike prior work, we show that the extent to which
a weak IPR in the host country imposes an appro-
priability threat to an MNE depends on where the
output of the R&D project is used. Innovations
produced for the host market entail the risk of
the expropriation of both patented and unpatented
knowledge, whereas inventions produced for the
home market, which has a strong IPR, entail the
risk of expropriation of only unpatented knowledge.
Consequently, innovations intended for host mar-
kets with a weak IPR have lower levels of host
inventor participation compared to those aimed at
the homemarket. This finding adds to prior work on
offshore R&D in weak IPR locations by Branstetter
et al. (2006) and Zhao (2006). Since Zhao (2006)
uses patents filed at the US.PTO to test her hypothe-
ses, although she implicitly alludes to the fact that
many patents that are invented in host countries
with a weak IPR are for global use, she does not
test the relative differential in host inventor involve-
ment across home and host patents. Branstetter
et al. (2006) show that royalty payments as well
as patents filed by nonresidents in the host coun-
try increase with stronger IPRs in the host country.
Thus, they implicitly suggest that stronger IPR at
host countries may matter for host R&D projects,
but they do not consider the influence of host IPRs
on home projects developed offshore at that host
location. We explicitly test how the strength of the
IPR at the host location and the nature of the R&D
project jointly influence the level of involvement
of host inventors in an offshore R&D project. Our
results are consistent with the intuition derived from
prior studies.
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Our results also have significant managerial
implications, especially for MNE managers look-
ing to capitalize on the relatively cheap innovation
talent available in weak IPR countries. Our results
suggest that the strength of the IPR matters differ-
ently depending on whether the fruits of the R&D
are utilized at home or in offshore markets. Thus,
our paper provides guidance for MNE managers
in deciding upon the extent of offshore R&D and
other considerations to bear in mind when selecting
projects for outsourcing to weak IPR locations.
Our results have interesting policy implications
as well. A country’s IPR is a significant component
of its national innovation system (Pavitt and Patel,
1999) and although MNE R&D has globalized,
national innovation systems, especially IPRs,
remain local (Carlsson, 2006). Our findings suggest
that IPRs seem to act mainly as a deterrent to
MNEs’ working on technologies that are partic-
ularly relevant to that host country. Grossman
and Helpman (1993) suggest that a weak IPR
may impede technology transfer and therefore
the economic growth of the offshore country.
Consistent with their work, our results suggest that
when IPR is weak, although the host location may
work on cutting-edge technology, it may not benefit
from such activity since the technology may more
relevant to the home market.
As with most work, ours also has limitations,
many of which we discussed and attempted to
mitigate in the section on robustness checks. Our
main limitations arise from two sources imposed
by the nature of the data, mainly because we lack
the details on the actual characteristics of the R&D
project, as well as the details of all the R&D
personnel involved in it.
The first relates to our proxy for the nature of the
offshore R&D project (home versus host). We base
our analysis on the country or countries in which the
patent assignee(s) opted to file, which is assumed to
be indicative of the market in which the patent is
largely relevant. In relation to the hypotheses that
we test in this paper, this assumption is relevant
only for patents that are filed in only one loca-
tion; that is, for Filed only in the US and Filed only
in Host patents. Our supplementary interviews and
data validation efforts largely support this assump-
tion.Moreover, to the extent that firms file patents in
the host location to prevent local competitors from
entering the home country, rather than because the
host country is a target market, these patents will be
classified asFiled in Both, and therefore are unlikely
to influence our results in our regressions. In addi-
tion, it is plausible that the staffing of an R&D
project may not happen with the all the end-use
locations in mind. For example, a home patent may
be filed later at the host location, when the host
market has become more mature. In this scenario
as before, we are likely to classify the patent as
Filed in Both. In addition, this scenario is less likely
because patents filed under the Patent Cooperation
Treaty have relatively less time for follow-on filings
in different countries, and therefore these patents
may indeed be staffed with the specific markets
in mind.
The second limitation relates to the measures we
use to proxy for the strength of IPR. It is plausible
that both our proxies for the strength of IPR pick
up other time varying differences between host
countries or subsidiaries. We acknowledge that this
cannot be perfectly identified simply because it is
difficult to devise a perfect measure of the strength
of the IPR in a country (cf. Arora, 2009). Prior
studies that analyze how institutional differences
between countries influence firm strategies, also
face the same problem in identifying the effect
of the institution apart from other unobserved
differences between the countries studied. In this
respect, our work is in line with prior work in
comparative institutional economics, such as those
by Zhao (2006); Branstetter et al. (2006); Lerner
(2009); Mahmood and Mitchell (2004); Chang,
Chung, and Mahmood (2006); Chacar and Vissa
(2005), and Chari and David (2012).
We attempted to address these limitations in
two ways: (1) by matching offshore patents with
those produced in the home country and in addition
matching offshore patents invented at host countries
with a strong IPR with those with a weak IPR (2)
by estimating a set of regressions where our results
rely on a set of differences-in-differences thereby
avoiding direct comparisons of patents invented
across the different types of locations. In other
words, even if offshore patents to strong versus
weak IPR locations are systematically different, our
results pertain to differences in the involvement of
host country inventors in weak IPR destinations,
but are filed in the home country versus in the
host country. However, they may not account for all
unobserved differences, a limitation we share with
most prior work in this area.
Despite these limitations, we believe the paper
contributes in a novel way to understanding how
MNE’s organize their R&D activities across
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geographies. We investigate how IPRs influence
decisions regarding staffing R&D projects at home
and at offshore locations and show that, when an
MNE’s talent base is scattered across geographies
that vary in IPR strength, the involvement of off-
shore inventors is sensitive not just to the strength
of the IPR at the host location, but also to the
nature of the R&D project. In fact, the influence
of the IPR strength is high enough to counter the
intuitive notion that host inventors are more likely
work on host R&D projects and home investors are
more likely to work on home R&D projects. We
thus hope that our paper inspires more such work
to provide deeper insight into the implications of
how MNEs manage institutional voids (such as a
poor IPR) across countries to create competitive
advantage.
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